
























zur Zukunft der Arbeit
Institute for the Study 
of Labor 
Lifetime Earnings Inequality in Germany










Free University of Berlin 
 
Giacomo Corneo 
Free University of Berlin, 














P.O. Box 7240   
53072 Bonn   
Germany   
 
Phone: +49-228-3894-0  







Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of IZA. Research published in 
this series may include views on policy, but the institute itself takes no institutional policy positions. 
 
The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center 
and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit 
organization supported by Deutsche Post Foundation. The center is associated with the University of 
Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its international network, workshops and 
conferences, data service, project support, research visits and doctoral program. IZA engages in (i) 
original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of 
policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public.  
 
IZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. 
Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be 












Lifetime Earnings Inequality in Germany
* 
 
This paper documents the magnitude, pattern, and evolution of lifetime earnings inequality in 
Germany. Based on a large sample of earning biographies from social security records, we 
show that the intra-generational distribution of lifetime earnings of male workers has a Gini 
coefficient around .2 for cohorts born in the late 1930s and early 1940s; this amounts to 
about 2/3 of the value of the Gini coefficient of annual earnings. Within cohorts, mobility in the 
distribution of yearly earnings is substantial at the beginning of the lifecycle, decreases 
afterwards and virtually vanishes after age forty. Earnings data for thirty-one cohorts reveals 
striking evidence of a secular rise of intra-generational inequality in lifetime earnings: West-
German men born in the early 1960s are likely to experience about 80 % more lifetime 
inequality than their fathers. In contrast, both short-term and long-term intra-generational 
mobility have been rather stable. Longer unemployment spells of workers at the bottom of the 
distribution of younger cohorts contribute to explain 30 to 40 % of the overall increase in 
lifetime earnings inequality. 
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1  Introduction 
 
Individuals often adopt their generation’s earnings and living standards as a benchmark for 
evaluating how successful they are and how well they fare. Intra-generational inequality also 
determines the extent to which individuals who live in the same country have the feeling of 
sharing a common fate, with major consequences for people’s trust in each other and their atti-
tudes towards policies and institutions that redistribute resources in society. Such assessments of 
intra-generational inequality quite naturally take a lifecycle perspective. Lifetime inequality 
appears to be more relevant than inequality in short time spans because the former is not sensi-
tive to income situations that are merely transitory, like low earnings during college years or 
especially high earnings thanks to temporarily skyrocketing bonuses. Furthermore, intra-
generational lifetime inequality is measured with respect to a stable subgroup of the population, 
so that it is not affected by changes in the composition of the population of income recipients. 
This paper documents for the first time the magnitude, structure and evolution of intra-
generational lifetime earnings inequality in Germany. We exploit data on earning biographies 
from social security administrative records to shed light on the following issues: What is the 
magnitude of lifetime earnings inequality and how does it compare to usual measures of ine-
quality of annual earnings? How do cohort-specific inequality and mobility evolve over the life-
cycle? Is lifetime inequality for individuals who now are in working age going to be larger or 
smaller than the one experienced by their parents? 
In order to answer those questions we analyze the earnings histories of thirty-one birth 
cohorts in Germany, ranging from individuals who were born in 1938 to those born in 1968. The 
dataset we scrutinize is a highly representative sample of the male employee population of West 
Germany. We define lifetime earnings as the present value of an individual’s earnings until the 
individual reaches age sixty. For the eleven oldest birth cohorts in our dataset we observe all 
annual earnings until they reach age sixty, so that we can compute their lifetime inequality as 
well as their mobility in the intra-generational distribution of annual earnings during their entire  
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active lifecycle. We observe younger cohorts’ earnings only for an initial part of their lifecycle 
and can compute measures of earnings inequality and mobility up to some age between forty 
and sixty. Using both the information about cohorts that have completed their labor-market life-
cycle and the information about the still active cohorts, we attempt to gauge how lifetime ine-
quality is evolving across generations in Germany. 
We find that the intra-generational distribution of lifetime earnings of male workers has 
a Gini coefficient around 0.2 for cohorts born in the late 1930s and that the extent of inequality 
of lifetime earnings is about 2/3 of the size of inequality of annual earnings. Age-specific annual 
earnings inequality follows a U-shaped pattern over the lifecycle, with a minimum reached 
around age thirty-five. Even controlling for age, measures of inequality of annual earnings sub-
stantially overestimate the inequality of lifetime earnings, the difference between the two meas-
ures being due to individuals’ mobility in the distribution over time. Within cohorts, mobility in 
the distribution of yearly earnings is substantial at the beginning of the life cycle, decreases af-
terwards and virtually vanishes after age forty. Age-earnings profiles are concave and steeper 
for better educated individuals. 
A comparison with the earning biographies of later cohorts reveals striking evidence of a 
secular rise of intra-generational inequality in lifetime earnings: West-German men born in the 
early 1960s are likely to experience about 80 % more lifetime inequality than their fathers. In 
contrast, both short term and long term intra-generational mobility have been rather stable for 
cohorts born after 1938. Intra-generational lifetime earnings inequality has increased both at the 
bottom half of the distribution and at the top half of the distribution, but the rise has been 
stronger at the bottom. We find that some 30 to 40 % of the rise of lifetime inequality in Ger-
many can be attributed to an increase of the duration of unemployment for individuals at the 
bottom of the earnings distribution, while the rest is due to the increase of intra-generational 
wage inequality. The substantial rise of lifetime earnings inequality documented in this paper is 
likely to have profound repercussions for a number of policy issues in Germany, including the  
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role of the welfare state, pension reform, and bequest taxation, as well as for broader cultural 
and social developments.1  
This paper is related to various strands of literature. Firstly, it relates to the literature on 
the long-run evolution of wage and earnings inequality. Our finding of a secular rise of intra-
generational lifetime earnings is, to the best of our knowledge, a novel one. There seem to be no 
other studies that attempt to pin down the evolution of the inequality of lifetime earnings. Clos-
est to the current paper is probably the article by Kopczuk et al. (2010) about earnings inequality 
in the United States. Using social security data, they compute Gini-coefficients of cohort-
specific long-term earnings distributions since 1937. Long-term earnings are defined as earnings 
over a twelve-year period and three benchmark periods are considered: from age twenty-five to 
age thirty-six, from age thirty-seven to age forty-eight, and from age forty-nine to age sixty. For 
cohorts born after the late 1930s, all three measures of long-term earnings exhibit a clear upward 
trend of cohort-specific inequality. If one takes that finding by Kopczuk et al. (2010) as evi-
dence of an increase in the intra-generational inequality of lifetime earnings, our result points to 
a remarkable analogy in the development of inequality in the US and in Germany.
2
 
Secondly, this paper complements various analyses of how wage inequality has evolved 
in Germany over the last three decades. The literature has mainly focused on the distribution of 
annual wages and discussed when inequality began to increase. Using social security records, 
Dustmann et al. (2009) find that earnings inequality has increased in West Germany in the 
1980s, but only at the top half of the distribution; in the early 1990s, inequality started to rise for 
the entire distribution. They argue that skill-biased technological change drove the widening of 
the wage distribution at the top, while changes in labor market institutions and immigration 
shocks were responsible for the increasing inequality at the bottom. Using data from the German 
                                                      
1 Wilkinson and Pickett (2009) have recently renewed the debate on the social effects of income inequality.  
4
Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) and German Income and Expenditure Survey (EVS), Fuchs-
Schündeln et al. (2010) confirm the rise of earnings inequality in West Germany after reunifica-
tion, the upward trend of inequality being mainly driven by an increase in earnings inequality 
after the year 2000. By contrast, they find that inequality has not noticeably increased during the 
1980s. Interestingly, they find that the experience premium has increased over time. Also using 
the GSOEP data, Gernandt and Pfeiffer (2007) find that inequality of hourly wages for prime-
age male employees was stable in West Germany between 1984 and 1994 and increased thereaf-
ter. In the period of increasing inequality they find a significant positive gap between high-
tenure and low-tenure workers in terms of respective wage growth rates. They suggest that the 
adjustment of wages to worsening labor market conditions mainly concerned the entrants in the 
labor market rather than the incumbents.
3
 Our paper adds to the overall picture of the evolution 
of inequality in Germany by establishing how lifetime earnings inequality has changed across 
cohorts, an aspect which is key to assess the implications of rising inequality for the welfare of 
the various generations. Furthermore, our investigation of age-earnings profiles over the entire 
lifecycle confirms the importance of controlling for the age composition of the workforce when 
evaluating long-run changes in the distribution of annual earnings.
4
   
Thirdly, our work is related to the literature on the relationship between annual and life-
time income inequality and the extent of intra-generational mobility.
5
 The main study of com-
plete income biographies is probably Björklund (1993), who exploits Swedish tax registers to 
compute the lifetime income before taxes of cohorts of men born between 1924 and 1936. Simi-
                                                      
2 Björklund (1993) studied the distribution of lifetime income in Sweden for cohorts born between 1924 and 1936. 
The evolution of the corresponding Gini-coefficients does not exhibit a systematic pattern, possibly because of 
sampling variation since the samples for each cohort are small.  
3 Dell (2005) and Bach et al. (2009) investigate the evolution of top salaries in Germany using tax returns data, as 
earners at the very top of the distribution are not represented well in social security and GSOEP data. Consis-
tently with results from other countries, they document an increase of top salary inequality after reunification. 
However, that inequality increase is much less accentuated than in the US. 
4 OECD (2008) gives an overview of the impact of demographic change on the income distribution. In a recent 
paper, Almas et al. (2010) provide evidence that changes in the age structure of the workforce had a significant 
impact on the Gini coefficient of annual earnings in Norway in the period 1967-2000.  
5
larly to our result for the cohorts born in the late 1930s, he finds that the Gini coefficient of the 
distribution of lifetime earnings is close to 0.2 and that it is around 35-40 percent lower than the 
one for cross-sections of annual incomes.
6
 Another common finding, shared by a number of 
studies of panels covering only subsets of the lifecycle, is the existence of substantial intra-
generational mobility during the early stages of the lifecycle.
7
 Björklund (1993) finds that age-
specific annual income inequality follows an L-shaped pattern over the lifecycle, i.e. the Gini-
coefficient of the distribution of annual income does not rise when individuals approach age 
sixty, as we find for earnings in Germany for later cohorts. That difference appears to be mainly 
due to the role of pensions, that are included in Björklund (1993)’s income concept whereas 
they do not count as earnings in our investigation.  
Fourthly, this paper adds to the literature on the lifecycle variation in the association be-
tween annual and lifetime earnings by assessing that association over completed lifecycles for 
the case of Germany.
8
 We confirm Björklund (1993)’s result that the correlation between annual 
income and lifetime income is quite high and stable after age thirty-five, while it is relatively 
low before. With respect to age-earnings profiles, our finding that they are much steeper for 
university graduates than for uneducated workers is in line with standard models of human capi-
tal investment. It also accords well with recent findings by Bhuller et al. (2011) based on Nor-
wegian earning biographies for cohorts born in the 1948-1950 period. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next Section, we describe our dataset 
and define the variables of interest. Section 3 quantifies lifetime earnings inequality and com-
                                                      
5 See Burkhauser and Couch (2009) for an excellent survey of the literature. 
6 Burkhauser and Poupore (1997) compare the distribution of annual earnings with the one of earnings over a six-
year period from 1983 to 1988. Using the GSOEP, they find that when the Gini coefficient is computed over six 
years, its level falls by less than ten percent. See also Maasoumi and Trede (2001). 
7 For West Germany, Trede (1998) analyzes short-run earnings mobility between 1983 and 1993 using the GSOEP. 
He finds that mobility declines with age until age thirty-five and does not change thereafter. 
8 Implications of that variation for regression models are discussed by Jenkins (1987) and further worked out by 
Haider and Solon (2006). Böhlmark and Lindquist (2006) apply Haider and Solon’s model to high-quality 
Swedish data. An application of the proposed methodology to correct for the lifecycle bias that uses German 
earnings data is Brenner (2010).  
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pares it with annual earnings inequality. Section 4 is devoted to the pattern of earnings mobility 
during the entire active lifecycle. In Section 5 we attack the issue of determining the evolution 
of intra-generational lifetime inequality and dissect its main driving forces. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2  Data and Methodology 
 
Our investigation of lifetime earnings exploits administrative data of the German social 
security. Virtually all employees in Germany mandatorily participate in its national pay-as-you-
go pension system which, being of the Bismarckian variety, carefully records all contributors’ 
earnings biographies.
9
 We analyze an excerpt of the social security data, namely the Insurance 
Account Sample (“Versicherungskontenstichprobe”, VSKT in the following). That is a stratified 
random sample of individuals who live in Germany, have at least one entry in their individual 
social security record, and are aged between thirty and sixty-seven in the reference year of the 
sample. Insurance Account Samples are provided for the reference years 2005, 2006, 2007 and 
2008 by the Data Research Center of the German Federal Pension Insurance. Each sample con-
tains the earnings biographies of the observed individuals up to the reference year. Data are col-
lected following individuals over time so as to form a panel. For each individual, its monthly 
history of employment, unemployment, sickness and, especially, of its contributions to the pen-
sion system is recorded. Information about contributions allows one to recover individual gross 
wages. Individual records cover the period from the year the insured reached age fourteen until 
the year the individual turned sixty-seven.
10
 We use the records of male earners who have only 
been working in West Germany. For each birth cohort, we are left with a number of individuals 
                                                      
9 A few categories of employees have distinctive pension systems and do not appear in the social security data, like 
civil servants, or are treated different to an ordinary insurant like miners and employees of the federal railways. 
10 We use all four samples in our analysis. Information on birth cohort 1938 is picked from the 2005 sample; in-
formation on the 1939 cohort comes from the 2006 sample; information on the 1940 cohort is taken from the 
2007 sample. Later birth cohorts are covered using the 2008 sample. 
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that roughly oscillates between 1,000 and 2,000; the exact numbers are reported in the Appen-
dix.  
Albeit the data we scrutinize is of high quality, some limitations remain. In order to ensure 
a consistent time series of earnings, three major adjustments were performed. The first one con-
cerns the imputation of one-time payments. Those payments were not included in the social 
security data before 1984. In order to work with a time invariant definition of earnings, we fol-
low a route suggested by Fitzenberger (1999) and also followed by Dustmann et al. (2009): we 
adjust earnings above the median for the years before 1984 using an earnings specific growth 
factor. 
The second adjustment is the addition of employers’ social contributions (to unemploy-
ment, health, pension and nursing care public insurances) to the individuals’ gross wages. Add-
ing those elements of pay is necessary in order to determine the market value of the individuals’ 
skills and in order to take into account the changes of contribution rates and assessment ceilings 
that have occurred over the years across various branches of the social insurance system and 
across various subgroups of the working population. 
Third, we deal with the issue of top-coded earnings. In Germany, employees contribute a 
share of their gross wage to the mandatory pension system up to a wage ceiling. As a result, the 
social security data is right-censored as individuals whose wages exceed that ceiling are re-
corded as if their wages were equal to that ceiling. Over all years and cohorts in our sample, 
censoring affects about 9.1 percent of the recorded yearly earnings. In order to better approxi-
mate the true distribution of top earnings, we impute them to individuals affected by top coding. 
Our imputation method rests on the assumption that the upper tail of the earnings distribution 
follows a Pareto-distribution. In our baseline approach, we posit that also the top 10 percent of 
individual earnings below the contribution ceiling are Pareto-distributed. Then, we estimate the 
corresponding Pareto-coefficient by OLS. The estimation is conducted separately for all years 
and birth cohorts. The estimated Pareto-coefficients are then used to determine the distribution  
8
of the unobserved earnings above the contribution ceiling. The assignment of estimated earnings 
to individuals is done so as to preserve the individual rankings in the earnings distribution. 
Thereby, the rank of an individual is based on the last observable rank in relation to all individu-
als at or above the contribution ceiling in the birth cohort specific earnings distribution. A cross-
check by comparing the obtained annual earnings distributions to uncapped distributions from 
survey-based micro data reveals a good fit.
11
 We also explore the implications of two alternative 
imputation procedures: an imputation of the estimated mean income above the ceiling to all 
individuals with top-coded earnings and a maximum mobility scenario where the ranking order 
is reversed every year. Results from those alternative imputation methods are reported in the 
Appendix. They do not differ much from those obtained under our preferred rank-preserving 
assumption. 
 
3  Inequality of Lifetime Earnings 
 
A key objective of this paper is to determine the extent of lifetime earnings inequality 
within annual birth cohorts. Lifetime earnings are computed from the earnings an individual has 
received from age seventeen to age sixty. We exclude earnings received in older age so as to 
avoid that measured lifetime earnings be significantly affected by early retirement decisions. 
The chosen age restriction implies that with the data at hand lifetime earnings can be computed 
for eleven cohorts born between 1938 and 1948. When computing lifetime earnings, we dis-
count yearly earnings to the year the individual turned seventeen and then determine the corre-
sponding present value of earnings. Two discounting methods are applied. The first one uses the 
average nominal return on German government bonds obtained from an official time series pro-
                                                      
11 For details, see Bönke (2009).  
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vided by the German central bank.
12
 The second one simply uses the consumer price index, so 
that lifetime earnings equal the unweighted sum of real annual earnings. 
Results about the Gini coefficient of the cohort-specific distribution of lifetime earnings 
are displayed in the lower part of Figure 1. The lowest curve represents the Gini coefficient of 
lifetime earnings when annual earnings are discounted using the returns from German federal 
bonds. The Gini coefficient oscillates between a minimum of 0.166 for the 1938 cohort and a 
maximum of 0.216 for those born in 1942. Discounting clearly affects the results, as shown by 
the second curve from below which is obtained without real discounting. Real discounting re-
duces intra-generational inequality because of the steeper rising age-profile of earnings for bet-
ter educated workers, who are also those with the larger lifetime earnings. We display those age-
earning profiles in Section 4. 
Inequality in lifetime earnings is of an order of magnitude smaller than inequality in an-
nual earnings. In order to assess the extent to which lifetime earnings inequality is overestimated 
by measures of yearly earnings inequality, we compare it with an average of measures of yearly 
earnings inequality. The curve lying in the middle of Figure 1 shows the average of the Gini 
coefficients of the distribution of yearly earnings for each cohort. Across all observed cohorts, 
that average Gini coefficient ranges from a minimum of 0.273 for the 1938 cohort to a maxi-
mum of 0.337 for the 1948 cohort. 
The above comparison draws from distributions of yearly earnings for individuals who 
have the same age. A comparison with yearly earnings distributions defined over individuals 
with possibly different age can be performed by constructing from each cohort a fictitious popu-
lation of individuals with yearly earnings. Thereby, yearly earnings of the same individual in 
two different years are treated as two observations of individual earnings in the same year. Time 
effects are taken into account by discounting to a common year, namely the year when the co-
                                                      
12 Details on the methodology used to compute the time series are available at 
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hort turned seventeen. Results for, respectively, the case of discounting using the German fed-
eral bonds and the case of real undiscounted earnings are depicted by the two curves in the up-
per part of Figure 1. Comparing those curves with the two corresponding curves in the lower 
part of Figure 1 reveals that cross-sectional Gini coefficients of annual earnings inequality tend 
to overestimate the inequality of lifetime earnings by about one third. 
In order to illustrate the implications of our finding, an interpretation of the Gini coeffi-
cient stressed e.g. by Sen (1973) may be useful. Accordingly, the Gini coefficient equals one 
half of the expected income difference between two randomly selected individuals divided by 
the average income in the population. A Gini coefficient of 0.3, which roughly corresponds to 
our finding for annual earnings inequality, means that in a hypothetical two-person economy the 
lower income amounts to 7/13 of the higher income. A Gini coefficient of 0.2, which roughly 
corresponds to our finding for lifetime earnings inequality, means that in a two-person economy 
the lower income amounts to 2/3 of the higher income. Thus, inequality measured from annual 




Figure 1: Gini coefficients of fictitious populations, means of the cross sectional Gini coeffi-
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4  Inequality and Mobility over the Lifecycle 
 
We are now in a position to assess how intra-generational inequality develops along the 
lifecycle of each cohort and how it relates to lifetime inequality. Figure 2 shows for each cohort 
the development of the Gini coefficient of annual earnings as a cohort grows older. A U-shaped 
pattern clearly emerges from the data. Inequality is maximal when the cohort is below twenty 
because many individuals have not yet entered the labor market and have thus zero earnings. 
Inequality then declines and reaches a minimum when the cohort is in its mid-thirties. After that, 
a period of rising inequality of annual earnings sets in. When individuals are sixty-years old, the 
distribution of their annual earnings has about the same Gini coefficient as the distribution that 
prevailed when they were twenty-years old. This pattern is consistent with the presumption that 
better educated workers have a relatively steeper age-earnings profile, something to which we 
return below. The sudden and short-lived rise of annual inequality when individuals are in their 
early twenties can be attributed to mandatory military and civil service, which entail a temporary 
lack of earnings. Older cohorts are less affected by that because the serving time increased from 
twelve to eighteen months in 1963.13 
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If age-earnings profiles systematically differ across members of the same cohort, some 
mobility in the intra-generational distribution of yearly earnings should be expected. Figure 3 
shows for each cohort the correlation of individuals’ ranks in the distributions of two consecu-
tive years. The displayed correlation coefficients are inversely related to the short-run mobility 
of individuals in the earnings distribution: the lower the coefficient, the higher is the mobility. 
According to Figure 3, some intra-generational mobility always exists and that mobility de-
creases with age. While there is significant mobility when the cohort is in its twenties, mobility 
virtually vanishes when the cohort enter its forties. This suggests that most of the intra-
generational mobility is the effect of the better educated catching up and then leaving behind the 
less educated, and that this process is almost completed when individuals are in their forties. 
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The correlation between annual and lifetime earnings is far from perfect and changes 
with age. Figure 4 shows that relationship for various cohorts for which lifetime earnings can be 
computed. When adulthood begins, annual earnings contain virtually no information about life-
time earnings as their mutual correlation is close to zero. The correlation between annual and 
lifetime earnings then rapidly increases with age. A correlation coefficient of 0.9 is reached 
when the cohort is at the end of its thirties and such a high level persists until the mid fifties. 
                                                      
13 The serving time was later reduced to fifteen months in the 1970s.  
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Thus, in that period of the lifecycle the level of individuals’ annual earnings can be considered 
representative of their respective lifetime earnings. A similar conclusion can be drawn from 
Figure 5, where the rank correlation between annual and lifetime earnings are depicted.
14
 
Figure 4: Correlation coefficients of annual and lifetime earnings with federal bond discounting 
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Cohort-specific age-earnings profiles for various educational attainments help to make 
sense of the observed mobility patterns. In Fig. 6 we plot those profiles for three levels of educa-
tion for the pooled cohorts from 1938 to 1948. The horizontal lines depict the annuitized value 
of the corresponding present value of lifetime earnings. All earnings are in real terms on the 
                                                      
14 Figures 4 and 5 use lifetime earnings discounted at the German federal bond rate. The corresponding figures for 
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basis of prices in 2000 and expressed in logs. For each educational group, the profile has a main-
ly rising, concave shape. However, the higher educated individuals experience more rapid earn-
ings growth through the entire lifecycle. Hence, the earnings dynamics triggered by human capi-
tal investment and the subsequent effects of accumulated knowledge in the accomplishment of 
intellectual tasks is consistent with the kind of mobility in the earnings distribution that is exhib-
ited by the data. 
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5  Evolution of Lifetime Inequality 
 
Are cohorts becoming more or less equal in terms of their lifetime earnings? This question 
cannot be satisfactorily answered by examining just the cohorts born between 1938 and 1948 for 
which lifetime earnings can be computed. We now exploit also the data available for younger 
cohorts in order to uncover patterns of the long-run evolution of lifetime earnings inequality in 
Germany. 
A natural generalization of the concept of lifetime earnings is “up-to-age-X” earnings, 
UAX for short. For a given individual, UAX is just the present value of all his earnings before 
he becomes X-years old. For each cohort, the Gini coefficient of the distribution of UAX can be 
                                                      
the case with real discounting are in the Appendix.   
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computed for different values of X. The higher the X, the closer that earnings measure to life-
time earnings, and the two concepts coincide if X = 60. Establishing how the Gini coefficient of 
the distribution of UAX has evolved over successive cohorts may provide valuable hints about 
the underlying evolution of lifetime earnings inequality. If younger cohorts display higher Gini 
coefficients for the same X and if this applies to all X, that would strongly suggest that there is a 
trend of increasing lifetime earnings inequality. The opposite conclusion would be drawn from 
observing lower Gini coefficients for younger cohorts; in that case one would argue that young-
er cohorts are characterized by less inequality and are likely to experience more equal lifetime 
earnings. 
The results in Section 4 indicate that mobility in the earnings distribution is significant un-
til about age forty. Therefore, we focus on the distribution of UAX for X>39. The VSKT ex-
cerpt from the social security data allows us to compute UAX for X>39 for the thirty-one co-
horts born between 1938 and 1968. For each cohort and each definition of X, one can then com-
pute the Gini coefficient of the distribution of UAX. Representative results are displayed in Fig-
ures 7 and 8 for earnings up to the ages of 40, 45, 50, 55, and 60 (lifetime earnings). The results 
are surprisingly clear. Gini coefficients trend upwards for each value of X. This strongly sug-
gests that younger generations are likely to experience more intra-generational lifetime eco-
nomic disparity than their fathers. 
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The increase in intra-generational earnings inequality is remarkable. To illustrate, one 
may compare the cohort born in 1938 with the cohort born in 1963, which may respectively be 
seen as “parents” and “children”. When they reached age forty-five, the parents’ generation was 
characterized by a distribution of accumulated earnings with a Gini coefficient of about 0.133. 
At the same age, their children’s generation was characterized by a distribution of accumulated 
earnings with a Gini coefficient of about 0.238, an increase of inequality by nearly 80 %. A sim-
ilar order of magnitude obtains when focusing on interquantile ratios. Figures 9 and 10 plot the 
evolution of the ratio between the UAX at the 85
th quantile and the one at the 15
th quantile, 
computed according to our two discounting methods. 
Figure 9: 85
th / 15
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Figures 7 and 8 clearly show that the inequality of accumulated earnings increases with 
age after age forty and that this is true for all cohorts. Thus, individuals who by age forty have 
received larger earnings tend to experience earnings growth at a higher rate at a later age. Fur-
thermore, inequality comparisons across cohorts tend to be rather unaffected by the age at which 
they are made. By way of an example, relative to its neighbouring cohorts, the cohorts of 1942 
and 1943 are characterized by a large inequality of UAX and that is true for all X>40. This sug-
gests that the evolution of inequality of lifetime earnings is likely to mirror the evolution of ine-
quality of earnings up to age forty. 
Our finding of rising intra-generational inequality does not hinge on the expansion of ter-
tiary education. Indeed, the same pattern as in Figures 7 and 8 obtains if UAX are computed 
starting with a higher age so that virtually all individuals in the sample participate in the labor 
market in all years when their earnings are taken into account. Representative results for UAX 
computed from earnings starting at age twenty-five are displayed in the Appendix. 
Further insights into the evolution of intra-generational inequality come from an analysis 
of the evolution of mobility after age forty. For each cohort, we compute the correlation between 
the individuals’ ranks in the distribution of UAX for X = 40 with their ranks in the distribution 
of UAX for 40<X≤60. Results for X = 41, 45, 50, 55, and 60 are plotted in Figures 11 and 12. 
No major change in mobility can be detected. By way of an example, the rank correlations ob- 
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served for the 1938 cohort are virtually undistinguishable from those observed for the 1963 co-
hort for the same X. The only noticeable change is an increase in mobility going from the cohort 
born in 1947 to the one born in 1950; that increase was however reversed by later cohorts.
15
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In order to get some insight into the proximate causes of the observed rise of lifetime 
earnings inequality in Germany, it is useful to assess how that inequality has evolved at various 
parts of the distribution. We have therefore replaced the Gini coefficient with generalized en-
                                                      
15 The cohorts born in West Germany in the late 1940s were the protagonists of the 1968 movement against bour-
geois way of life. Possibly, many future highly skilled employees who participated as students in that move-
ment participated less intensely in the labor market as compared to other generations and thus received rela-
tively low earnings during the initial part of their lifecycle. This might explain why those cohorts exhibit greater 
intra-generational long-term mobility.  
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tropy inequality indices that are more sensitive to distinctive parts of the distribution. Results for 
the Theil index, the mean logarithmic deviation and half the squared coefficient of variation are 
exhibited in the Appendix. They suggest that intra-generational lifetime inequality has signifi-
cantly increased both at the bottom and at the top of the distribution. Here, we merely present 
the evolution of two interquantile ratios of the UAX distribution that respectively capture ine-
quality at the bottom and at the top of the distribution. Figures 13 plots the 50
th / 15
th ratio while 
Figures 14 plots the 85
th / 50
th ratio, both using the discount factors based on Federal bonds. 
Figure 13: 50
th / 15
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While lifetime earnings inequality has increased both at the bottom and at the top of the 
distribution, the above Figures show that the increase has been stronger at the bottom of the  
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distribution. As this may be driven by the rise of the incidence of unemployment for low-skill 
workers, it is instructive to disentangle the effect on inequality due to changes in the distribution 
of unemployment spells from the one due to changes in the wage structure. 
Figures 15 and 16 below plot for each cohort the average number of months spent in em-
ployment, unemployment, and other ways during the life span that goes from age seventeen to 
age forty. The residual category includes civil and military service, periods of occupational dis-
ability, and college education. Within each cohort, individuals have been ranked into quartiles 
according to their lifetime earnings up to age forty, computed with Federal Bond discounting. 
Fig. 15 displays the quartiles in the bottom half of the cohort-specific distributions whereas Fig. 
16 displays the upper half of the same distributions. Those Figures reveal a substantial increase 
of periods of unemployment for the bottom quartile, a moderate increase for the next quartile, 
and virtual stability for the upper half of the distribution. Individuals in the bottom quartile of 
the earnings distributions of cohorts born in the late 1930s spent on average about 5 months in 
unemployment before reaching age forty. By contrast, their statistical children born in the mid 
1960s spent about 42 months in unemployment before reaching age forty. For individuals in the 
upper half of the distribution, no comparable rise of unemployment incidence for the younger 
cohorts can be observed. Interestingly, the same pattern arises if one only considers the em-
ployment records starting with age twenty-five, see Figures R 11 and R 12 in the Appendix. 






































































The substantial increase of unemployment spells at the bottom of the intra-generational 
earnings distribution suggests that it may be a major driving factor behind the secular rise of 
lifetime earnings inequality in Germany. In order to quantify that effect, we simulate the evolu-
tion of lifetime inequality under the counterfactual of full employment. Based on the actual 
earning distribution, we construct a hypothetical scenario by imputing earnings when individu-
als are not recorded as employed. The imputed value for an individual is the last earning level 
observed for that individual.
16
 Results for the hypothetical distributions of UAX are plotted in 
Figures 17 and 18. In Fig. 17, earnings have been imputed for all months in which an individual 
was not in employment. In Fig. 18, earnings have only been imputed for the months in which an 









                                                      
16 In cases where no previous individual earnings are observed, we impute retrospectively the first level of earnings 
observed for that individual.  
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Figure 18: Ginis of UAX- earnings with federal bond discounting for cohorts 1938-1968 with 
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Comparing Figures 17 and 18 with Fig. 7 reveals that the unequal evolution of unem-
ployment spells goes some way in explaining the rise of lifetime earnings inequality. To illus-
trate, consider again the cohort born in 1938 and the one of their statistical children born in 
1963. In the scenario of complete imputation (Fig. 17), when the parents reached age forty-five 
their accumulated earnings were distributed with a Gini coefficient of about .115. At the same 
age, their children’s generation was characterized by a distribution of accumulated earnings with 
a Gini coefficient of about .175, an increase of inequality by slightly more than 50 %. In the 
scenario of imputation for unemployment only (Fig. 18), the same comparison yields an increase 
of the Gini coefficient by slightly more than 60 %. In both cases, the Gini coefficient increases  
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by considerably less than 80 %, the growth rate obtained from the data used for Fig. 7. This 
suggests that the unequal evolution of unemployment spells for individuals at different points of 
the earnings distribution contributes to explain some 30 to 40 percent of the secular rise of life-
time earnings inequality. The remaining 60 to 70 percent can be attributed to the evolution of 
wage inequality. 
  
6  Conclusion 
 
We have documented for the first time the magnitude, pattern, and evolution of lifetime 
earnings inequality in Germany. Based on a large sample of earning biographies from social 
security records, we have shown that the intra-generational distribution of lifetime earnings of 
male workers has a Gini coefficient around .2 for cohorts born in the late 1930s and early 1940s; 
this amounts to about 2/3 of the value of the Gini coefficient of annual earnings. Within cohorts, 
mobility in the distribution of yearly earnings is substantial at the beginning of the lifecycle, 
decreases afterwards and virtually vanishes after age forty. The main novel finding from this 
investigation is the one of a secular rise of intra-generational inequality in lifetime earnings: 
West-German men born in the early 1960s are likely to experience about 80 % more lifetime 
inequality than their fathers. Longer unemployment spells of workers at the bottom of the distri-
bution of younger cohorts contribute to explain some 30 to 40 percent of the overall increase in 
lifetime earnings inequality. The remaining 60 to 70 percent is due to the increase of wage ine-
quality. 
The 80 % rise in lifetime earnings inequality that we observe when comparing the genera-
tions born around World War II with those of the baby boomers of the 1960s is large and unlike-
ly to be offset by more progressive taxes and transfers. It is bound to have far-reaching repercus-
sions for a number of policy issues, including the role of the welfare state, pension reform, and 
bequest taxation, as well as for how people relate to each other and see themselves as members 
of society.  
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Appendix A: Descriptive statistics and alternative imputations 
 
Table A1: Number of observations up to a certain age, unweighted. 
Birth cohort  Up to 40  Up to 45  Up to 50  Up to 55  Up to 60 
1938 1,033 1,018 1,004  992  987 
1939 1,132 1,096 1,076 1,049 1,039 
1940 1,074 1,051 1,043 1,045 1,040 
1941 1,105 1,090 1,079 1,072 1,075 
1942 1,125 1,104 1,110 1,089 1,086 
1943 1,146 1,135 1,114 1,093 1,083 
1944 1,144 1,109 1,089 1,059 1,057 
1945 1,177 1,158 1,146 1,138 1,137 
1946 1,214 1,167 1,144 1,124 1,103 
1947 1,205 1,173 1,150 1,128 1,112 
1948 1,190 1,152 1,127 1,115 1,085 
1949 1,189 1,149 1,121 1,103   
1950 1,209 1,163 1,138 1,120   
1951 1,204 1,169 1,133 1,122   
1952 1,233 1,179 1,152 1,137   
1953 1,171 1,133 1,103 1,080   
1954 1,221 1,173 1,148     
1955 1,275 1,226 1,197     
1956 1,349 1,294 1,252     
1957 1,299 1,260 1,238     
1958 1,365 1,335 1,275     
1959  1,430  1,382     
1960  1,545  1,494     
1961  1,704  1,651     
1962  1,881  1,805     
1963  1,913  1,819     
1964  1,897      
1965  2,026      
1966  2,007      
1967  1,982      
1968  2,096      
  43,541 32,485 23,839 17,466 11,804 
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Table A2: Number of observations up to a certain age, weighted. 
 Birth cohort  Up to 40  Up to 45  Up to 50  Up to 55  Up to 60 
1938  220,232 217,133 215,383 212,369 210,566 
1939  248,090 239,754 234,731 228,828 226,207 
1940  241,934 237,150 235,451 235,428 233,502 
1941  223,777 221,106 218,880 217,072 217,911 
1942  185,553 182,294 183,037 179,488 179,076 
1943  189,304 187,452 184,261 180,665 179,451 
1944  187,669 180,465 177,095 171,838 171,621 
1945  148,087 145,490 143,321 141,886 141,534 
1946  186,823 180,147 176,580 173,469 169,953 
1947  202,736 198,089 194,473 190,454 187,583 
1948  210,821 204,147 199,922 198,110 193,110 
1949  224,189 216,556 211,653 208,567   
1950  229,461 221,167 216,950 213,633   
1951  213,650 208,678 202,316 199,721   
1952  220,289 210,641 204,772 202,641   
1953  204,980 199,173 193,775 190,055   
1954  225,753 217,265 212,062     
1955  227,899 220,669 214,523     
1956  244,608 234,339 226,798     
1957  243,499 236,167 231,693     
1958  249,580 244,416 233,676     
1959  269,384  262,298     
1960  276,926  267,851     
1961  281,291  273,518     
1962  297,397  287,350     
1963  299,297  286,464     
1964  305,386      
1965  307,182      
1966  307,047      
1967  310,611      
1968  297,228             
    7,480,683 5,779,779 4,311,352 3,144,224 2,110,514 
 
 
Table A3: UAX Ginis for selected cohorts. 
Cohort  Up to 40  Up to 45  Up to 50  Up to 55  Up to 60 
1938 0.130 0.133 0.147 0.160 0.166 
  (0.124; 0.138)  (0.126; 0.141)  (0.138; 0.157)  (0.149; 0.172)  (0.156; 0.180) 
1943 0.158 0.175 0.196 0.211 0.215 
  (0.149; 0.168)  (0.164; 0.188)  (0.184; 0.212)  (0.197; 0.228)  (0.202; 0.230) 
1948 0.155 0.167 0.183 0.192 0.203 
  (0.146; 0.166)  (0.157; 0.180)  (0.171; 0.197)  (0.180; 0.206)  (0.190; 0.218) 
1953 0.173 0.184 0.196 0.211   
  (0.164; 0.184)  (0.173; 0.197)  (0.184; 0.211)  (0.199; 0.230)   
1958 0.196 0.213 0.228     
  (0.185; 0.208)  (0.202; 0.233)  (0.213; 0.250)     
1963 0.224 0.238       
  (0.214; 0.236)  (0.225; 0.251)       
1968  0.240      
 (0.229;  0.255)        
Note: Bias corrected and accelerated bootstrap confidence intervals at the 95%-level in brackets.  
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Figure 1 b: Comparison of Gini coefficients of fictitious populations, mean of cross sectional 
Ginis and the lifetime earnings. Assumption of maximal mobility, mean imputed earnings and 
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Figure 2 b: Annual Gini coefficients from 17 to 60 for cohorts 1938-1948. Assumption of max-
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Figure 3b: Rank correlations of consecutive years for cohorts 1938-1948. Assumption of maxi-
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Figure 4b: Correlation coefficients of annual and lifetime earnings with federal bond discount-
ing for cohorts 1938-1948. Assumption of maximal mobility, mean imputed earning and not 
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Figure 4c: Correlation coefficients of annual and lifetime earnings with real discounting for co-
horts 1938-1948. Assumption of minimal mobility, maximal mobility, mean imputed earning 
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Figure 5b: Rank correlation of annual and lifetime earnings with federal bond discounting for 
cohorts 1938-1948. Assumption of maximal mobility, mean imputed earning and not imputed 
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Figure 5c: Rank correlation of annual and lifetime earnings with real discounting for cohorts 
1938-1948. Assumption of minimal mobility, maximal mobility, mean imputed earning and not 
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Figure 6b: Ginis of UAX- earnings with federal bond discounting for cohorts 1938-1968. As-
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Figure 7b: Ginis of real UAX- earnings for cohorts 1938-1968. Assumption of maximal mobil-
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th ratio of UAX- earnings with federal bond discounting for cohorts 1938-
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th ratio of real UAX- earnings for cohorts 1938-1968. Assumption of maxi-
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Figure 11b: Rank correlation UA-40 earnings with UAX earnings, federal bond discounting. 
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Figure 12c: Rank correlation real UA-40 earnings with real UAX earnings. Assumption of max-
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Figure 13b: 50th / 15th ratio of UAX- earnings with federal bond discounting for cohorts 1938-
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Figure 13b: 50th / 15th ratio of UAX- earnings with federal bond discounting for cohorts 1938-
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Appendix B: Generalized entropy measures  
 
Figure B 1: GE[0] (Mean logarithmic deviation) of UAX- earnings with federal bond discount-
ing for cohorts 1938-1968. Assumption  of minimal mobility, maximal mobility, mean imputed 
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Figure B 2: GE[0] (Mean logarithmic deviation) of real UAX- earnings for cohorts 1938-1968. 
Assumption of minimal mobility, maximal mobility, mean imputed earnings and not imputed 
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Figure B 3: GE[1] (Theil index) of UAX- earnings with federal bond discounting for cohorts 
1938-1968. Assumption of minimal mobility, maximal mobility, mean imputed earnings and not 
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Figure B 4: GE[1] (Theil index) of real UAX- earnings for cohorts 1938-1968. Assumption of 
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Figure B 5: GE[2] (Half the square of the coefficient of variation) of UAX- earnings with fed-
eral bond discounting for cohorts 1938-1968. Assumption of minimal mobility, maximal mobil-
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Figure B 6: GE[2] (Half the square of the coefficient of variation) of real UAX- earnings for 
cohorts 1938-1968. Assumption of minimal mobility, maximal mobility, mean imputed earnings 
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Appendix C: Robustness, NPV from 25 to X 
 
Figure R 1 b: Comparison of the Gini coefficients of the artificial/fictive population, the means 
of the cross sectional Gini and the lifetime earnings from 25-60 with real earnings and federal 
bond discounted earnings for cohorts 1938-1948. Assumption of minimal mobility, maximal 
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Figure R 4b: Correlation coefficients of annual and lifetime earnings with federal bond discount-
ing for cohorts 1938-1948. Assumption of minimal mobility, maximal mobility, mean imputed 
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Figure R 4c: Correlation coefficients of annual and lifetime earnings with real discounting for 
cohorts 1938-1948. Assumption of minimal mobility, maximal mobility, mean imputed earnings 
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Figure R 5b: Rank correlation of annual and lifetime earnings with federal bond discounting for 
cohorts 1938-1948. Assumption of minimal mobility, maximal mobility, mean imputed earnings 



























18 23 28 33 38 43 48 53 58
Age
Cohort 1938 Cohort 1940
Cohort 1942 Cohort 1944



























18 23 28 33 38 43 48 53 58
Age
Cohort 1938 Cohort 1940
Cohort 1942 Cohort 1944




























18 23 28 33 38 43 48 53 58
Age
Cohort 1938 Cohort 1940
Cohort 1942 Cohort 1944



























18 23 28 33 38 43 48 53 58
Age
Cohort 1938 Cohort 1940
Cohort 1942 Cohort 1944
Cohort 1946 Cohort 1948
 
 
Figure R 5c: Rank correlation of annual and lifetime earnings with real discounting for cohorts 
1938-1948.  Assumption of minimal mobility, maximal mobility, mean imputed earnings and 
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Figure R 6b: Ginis of UAX- earnings with federal bond discounting for cohorts 1938-1968. 
Assumption of minimal mob, maximal mobility, mean imputed earnings and not imputed earn-
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Figure R 7b: Ginis of real UAX- earnings for cohorts 1938-1968. Assumption of maximal mo-
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Figure R 8b: Rank correlation of UA-40 earnings with UAX earnings, federal bond discounting. 
Assumption of minimal mobility, maximal mobility, mean imputed earnings and not imputed 
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Figure R 8c: Rank correlation real UA-40 earnings with real UAX earnings. Assumption of 





























1938 1943 1948 1953 1958 1963 1968
Year of Birth
Up to age 60 Up to age 55
Up to age 50 Up to age 45




























1938 1943 1948 1953 1958 1963 1968
Year of Birth
Up to age 60 Up to age 55
Up to age 50 Up to age 45





























1938 1943 1948 1953 1958 1963 1968
Year of Birth
Up to age 60 Up to age 55
Up to age 50 Up to age 45































1938 1943 1948 1953 1958 1963 1968
Year of Birth
Up to age 60 Up to age 55
Up to age 50 Up to age 45

























































1938 1943 1948 1953 1958 1963 19681938 1943 1948 1953 1958 1963 1968
3 4
Other Unemployed
Employed
n
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
m
o
n
t
h
s
cohort
Graphs by quartile
 